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Nationalism, in the words of Anthony Smith, is the belief that all those who share a 
common history and culture should be ‘autonomous, united and distinct in their recognised 
homelands’.1 It is a modern phenomenon that concerns, generally speaking, the demand by a 
group for a State, by virtue of the fact that the group is a ‘Nation’. The claim is advanced in 
two related steps: first, that each Nation is, if it so chooses, entitled to its own State, and, 
second, the territorial State in which the Nation is located enjoys limited, if any, authority 
over certain subjects, by virtue of the ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences between the 
centre and the relevant group.2 The manifestation of a sentiment of national self-
determination is a reaction by the periphery to the homogenizing efforts of the language and 
culture of the centre, and a conflict over the assertion of political authority and the place and 
meaning of the boundary between the centre and the Nation.  
 
A cursory glance at the different maps drawn since 1900 might suggest that the nationalist 
argument has proved highly effective, as world political society has changed form a handful 
of largely European Empires to over 200 sovereign and independent States.3 This 
interpretation would be mistaken. The process by which new States have emerged – in 
particular in the period since the inception of the United Nations – has in fact undermined 
the distinctive claim of nationalisms, i.e. the right to a ‘Nation-State’. The claim may appear 
                                                
* Professor of International Law, University of Lancaster. My thanks to Robert Geyer, James Summers and Tom Webb for comments on 
an earlier draft. 
1 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1979), p. 2. 
2 See generally Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); and John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, 2nd ed. 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993).  
3 New States have emerged in a number of waves, notably at the time of the United Nations decolonization movement in the 1960s, during 
which decade 42 States were admitted to UN membership; and the partial collapse of the Soviet Empire and dissolution of Yugoslavia in 
the 1990s, when 32 new members were admitted. Since the turn of the twenty-first century, only 5 new States have been admitted to the 
United Nations (a significant decrease on the average). 
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paradoxical as many would claim that it was nationalism that replaced Empire as the 
organizing principle of world political society, and we continue to see new States emerge in 
response to the nationalist demands – a State of Montenegro for Montenegrins, for example. 
An examination of the international law doctrine and practice demonstrates, however, that 
when questions of legitimacy supplemented the criterion of effectiveness for the 
establishment of new States, political authority was framed in terms of a consent-based or 
‘democratic’ self-determination, and not any nationalist principle. This is explained by 
reference to the turn to ethics in international law that accompanied the introduction of the 
United Nations as an organization of global governance capable of giving expression to the 
inchoate values of the international community, and which has resulted in arguments for 
significant modifications to the ‘Montevideo checklist’ for the identifications of new States 
and revised understandings as to the required conditions for the emergence of new States.  
 
The objective of this chapter is to evaluate the extent to which the change in the emergent 
teleology of the international law system, reflected in a focus on the idea of legitimate 
political authority, can accommodate a right of democratic secession: the right of a group to 
a State by virtue of the fact that its political leaders have been able to mobilize majority 
support around a nationalist case in favour of independence. The work proceeds as follows. 
It first outlines the way in which international law responds to claims for recognition of the 
right of national self-determination – understood here as the claim to a sovereign and 
independent State. The extant incoherence in the existing doctrine and practice on political 
self-determination and statehood suggests a requirement for a new conceptual model to 
make sense of this problem. In common with a long tradition in the social sciences 
(including law), the chapter looks to developments in the natural sciences to make sense of 
the social world – in this case by reference to a variant of systems theory known as 
complexity, which is focused on emergent systems that represent the patterned 
communications of networks of agents, without any central controller or guiding hand.  
 
The rationale for relying on complexity is grounded in the perceived advances of an 
approach that is considered to illuminate debates in international law in a way that is clear 
about its underlying conceptual base and consistent in its application. Complexity is relied on 
metaphorically: law and politics systems are understood to be like the complex systems we 
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observe in the natural world – and are therefore amenable to an application of the insights of 
complex systems theory thinking. Whilst there is an emerging literature that seeks to apply 
the insights from complexity to domestic law systems,4 hitherto, complexity has had limited 
impact on international law scholarship, and there has been no attempt to apply its insights 
to the law on national self-determination.5 Following the insights from complexity, we can 
develop an abstract model of State as the observation of the patterned communications of 
the coevolved and coexistent law and politics systems. The third part of the chapter relies on 
this abstract model to outline a right of democratic secession in three related steps: the 
rejection of the sovereign authority of the territorial State by certain subjects; the acceptance 
of the authority of emergent systems of law and politics of a new political entity; and 
observation (or ‘recognition’) of the political entity as possessing legitimate political 
authority. The work concludes by reflecting on the implications of the analysis for the events 
of 2014 in the Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine.  
 
The international law on national self-determination  
 
The nationalist argument is the each Nation has the right, if it so chooses, to its own State. 
The justification for the position lies in the claim that Nations and their cultures are both 
valuable in themselves and important to individuals in terms of identity, well-being and 
flourishing, and that the Nation and those marked by the national culture are best protected 
within a sovereign and independent Nation-State. Where this is not already the case, the 
literature suggests that the group has the right to establish a State on one of three grounds: 
that each Nation has the right to a State on its territorial homeland; that individual members 
of the Nation have a choice-based, or democratic, right of secession; and that, in cases of 
extreme injustice, the group has a remedial right of secession. This section briefly outlines 
the ways in which international law responds to these claims.  
 
                                                
4 See, for example, Hope M. Babcock, ‘Democracy’s Discontent in a Complex World: Cab Avalanches Sandpiles, and Finches Optimize 
Michael Sandel’s Civic Republican Community?’ (1996-7) 85 Geo. L. J. 2085; Gregory Todd Jones, ‘Dynamical Jurisprudence: Law as a 
Complex System’ 24 Georgia State University Law Review 873; Julian Webb, ‘Law, ethics, and complexity: Complexity theory & the normative 
reconstruction of law’ (2005) 52 Cleveland State Law Review 227; and Thomas Webb, ‘Tracing an Outline of Legal Complexity’ Ratio Juris 
(forthcoming). 
5 Lars-Erik Cederman applies the insights from complexity in an attempt to explain the processes that lead to the establishment of new 
nation-states: Lars-Erik Cederman, Emergent actors in world politics: How States and Nations develop and dissolve (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1997). See also Lars-Erik Cederman and Luc Girardin, ‘Growing Sovereignty: Modeling the Shift from Indirect to Direct 
Rule’ (2010) 54 International Studies Quarterly 27. 
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The term ‘Nation’ in international law can refer either to the State (the international Law of 
Nations), or to groups within the State or that cross State borders. For reasons of clarity, this 
work will use the more common international law terminology of ‘State’ and ‘people’. The 
distinctive claim of nationalism, i.e. the right of a Nation to a State, is then reformulated in 
terms of the right of peoples to political self-determination, statehood and independence. 
The traditional position of international law has been that the establishment of a Sovereign 
political community is a question of fact: an effective political power under the rule of law 
has a prima facie claim to be accepted as a State. Outside of the state-of-nature, international 
law recognized a right of sovereignty where a political community was able to establish its 
independence ‘safely and permanently’ (in the words of the Lassa Oppenheim) from the 
previous sovereign power.6 The position remains unchanged in the present day: an entity 
that can, by its own efforts, establish itself ‘safely and permanently’ within a territory has a 
claim to be accepted as a State.  
 
Whilst there is consensus in the literature that effectiveness (the exercise of independent 
government functions over a territory and population) is a necessary, and often the most 
important, criterion of statehood, there is disagreement as to whether it is a sufficient 
criterion as a consequence of the non-recognition of certain State-like entities, including 
Southern Rhodesia and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. A revised understanding is 
developed in one of two ways. First, as a modification of the ‘Montevideo checklist’:7 a 
prohibition on statehood where independence results from an unlawful act of military 
intervention (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus), or where independence is achieved 
through a violation of the rights of people to self-determination based on political equality 
(Southern Rhodesia). Secondly, that certain principles related to an idea of legitimacy can 
support or undermine the claim to ‘effectiveness’: an ineffective but legitimate political 
community may be recognized as a State (Guinea-Bissau, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina), 
whilst an effective but illegitimate political community may not be recognized (Southern 
Rhodesia, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and Transdniestria). 
 
                                                
6 L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, Vol. I. Peace [1st ed.] (London, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1905), pp. 112-3. 
7 According to Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Adopted 26 December 1933. Reprinted (1934) 28 
(Supplement) American Journal of International Law 75), State as legal person in international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) 
permanent population; (b) defined territory; (c) government; (d) and the capacity to enter into relations with other States (usually understood as 
independence).  
 5 
The normal mechanism by which a new State is established is through its separation from 
the territorial State. This is a consensual process. Where the territorial State accepts and 
recognizes the newly independent State, the international community will normally follow its 
lead, unless the new State is established in violation of an international law norm of jus cogens 
standing. Where the territorial State does not consent to the establishment of the new State, 
the relevant process is unilateral secession. This can be achieved in one of two ways: through 
effective control of the territory ‘safely and permanently’ or by virtue of the right of peoples 
to self-determination. A positive application of the right to self-determination would 
logically accord a right to statehood in the absence of effective political control. Consider, 
for example, the practice of creating Nation-States following World War I, when the 
Peacemakers (pace Margaret Macmillan) sought, on objective criteria, to identify Nations and to 
establish their sovereign and independent existence – a process foreshadowed in President 
Woodrow Wilson’s ‘Fourteen Points’ address to Congress in 1918, in which he called for the 
establishment of a State of Poland, ‘which should include the territories inhabited by 
indisputably Polish populations’.8  
 
The United Nations decolonization project took a different approach to the post World War 
I settlement, establishing a right of political self-determination and statehood only for non-
contiguous colonised territories.9 ‘Colonized’ peoples were defined by their relationship to 
the territory, and not any racial, ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics. The 
territorial approach to defining ‘peoples’ was confirmed by the application of the principle of 
uti possidetis: the requirement for the recognition of colonial administrative borders as the 
boundaries of political self-determination. As Hurst Hannum explains, in the UN 
decolonization process, ‘[t]erritory, not “nationhood,” was the determining factor’.10 The 
negative aspect of the international law right of peoples to self-determination developed by 
the United Nations denies political legitimacy in cases of colonial rule and accords a right to 
independence and statehood to non-self-governing territories.  
 
                                                
8 Point XIII. Woodrow Wilson, ‘An address to a Joint Session of Congress’ (The Fourteen Points Address)’, 8 January 1918, reprinted The 
Papers of Woodrow Wilson 45 (Arthur S. Link et al. (ed.), Princeton NJ: Princeton UP, 1966-94), p. 534. 
9 GA Res. 1514 (XV), adopted 14 December 1960, ‘Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples’. 
10 Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights (Philadelphia: University Pennsylvania 
Press, 1990), p. 36 
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The fact that the overwhelming majority of non-self-governing territories have achieved 
political self-determination by way of independence, integration or association does not 
exhaust the application of the right of peoples to self-determination. According to general, 
customary and conventional international law: ‘All peoples have the right to self-
determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status’.11 Whilst, 
there is no agreed international law definition of ‘people’, four general criteria are normally 
considered to relevant in the identification of peoples: some identity characteristic that 
differentiates members of the group from others, based on race, ethnicity, culture, language, 
religion, or common economic life, etc.; historical continuity, understood in terms that 
peoples have a history and an imagined future; that the group is associated with a particular 
territory, or ‘homeland’; and the self-conception of the group as an actual or potential unit of 
self-determination. Self-evidently these criteria can encompass ethno-cultural groups within 
the State, and it is accepted that the international law category of ‘people’ can be applied to 
groups within a State that consequently enjoy a right to political self-determination. It is less 
clear what the consequences of such a recognition entail, although there is general agreement 
in the international law doctrine and literature that the right of peoples to political self-
determination does not (alone) accord a right to statehood for sub-State groups.  
 
Whilst self-determination does not establish a right to statehood, this does not preclude the 
possibility of a group within the State declaring its independence,12 or achieving statehood 
through the establishment of effective control over a territory and its population – as 
secession is neither lawful, nor unlawful, as a matter of international law.13 The right of the 
State to its territorial integrity is opposable to (i.e. valid against) other States, not peoples and 
groups within the State. Where a politically effective people becomes de facto autonomous 
and independent, without external military support, it has a claim to be a State. But what 
about politically ineffective peoples? Outside of the colonial context, three possible scenarios 
can be identified for accepting a right of independence for groups seeking statehood, but 
which are unable to establish effective control: in cases of serious human rights abuses 
(‘remedial secession’); the internationalization of promises of independence in certain 
                                                
11 Article 1(1), common to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI), 16 December 1966, into force 23 March 1976 (emphasis added). 
12 See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 
403. para. 122. 
13 James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 390. 
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circumstances (‘promissory secession’); and following a positive vote in an independence 
referendum or its functional equivalent (‘democratic secession’).  
 
In cases of serious human rights abuses following the exclusion of one part of the 
population from the political process, a number of authors identify a remedial right of 
secession through a reverse reading of the so-called ‘saving clause’ in the Declaration on 
Friendly Relations,14 and the emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign and independent State. 
Whether the remedial right of secession establishes a right of independence opposable to the 
territorial State and all other States erga omnes, or simply negates the proscription on achieving 
statehood with the support of external military forces is unclear given the limited doctrine 
and practice. Whilst recognized by a number of authors, the existence of the remedial right 
of secession is disputed by many scholars as a matter of international law.  
 
The second possibility for recognizing a right to statehood for politically ineffective peoples 
is where a domestic constitution or international peace agreement promises independence 
following the holding of a valid referendum (‘promissory secession’). The relevant State 
practice concerns South Sudan, whose right to statehood via a democratic referendum was 
guaranteed under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 9 January 2005 and the domestic 
laws of Sudan;15 the separation of Montenegro in accordance with the Constitution of Serbia 
and Montenegro;16 and (arguably) the Edinburgh Agreement between the United Kingdom 
Government and the Scottish Government, which provided that the independence 
referendum should ‘deliver a fair test and a decisive expression of the views of people in 
Scotland and a result that everyone will respect.’17 The domestic or international guarantee is 
understood to ‘trigger’ a particular application of the right of peoples to political self-
determination, in the form of a right to an independent State. International law scholars take 
different positions as to whether this argument can be sustained and there is limited evidence 
for the position in the relevant jurisprudence, although the Canadian Supreme Court did 
conclude that secession should be the result of a negotiated process between the relevant 
                                                
14 GA Res. 2625 (XXV), adopted October 24, 1970, ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’. 
15 See Jure Vidmar, ‘Explaining The Legal Effects Of Recognition’ (2012) 61 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 361, 368-9.  
16 Susanna Mancini, ‘Rethinking the boundaries of democratic secession: Liberalism, nationalism, and the right of minorities to self-
determination’ (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 553, 582. 
17 Agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government on a referendum on independence for Scotland, 15 
October 2012 (emphasis added). Available http://www.scotland.gov.uk/About/Government/concordats/Referendum-on-independence 
(last visited 25 September 2014). 
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parties, and that the way in which the parties engaged with the process would influence the 
question of recognition by outside States.18 In other words, the (internal) promise made by 
the State government (expressly or impliedly) to engage in a process leading to independence 
may well create (external) international law obligations opposable to the territorial State. 
 
The third possibility is to recognize that a positive vote in support of independence in a valid 
referendum can create an international law right of secession for politically ineffective 
peoples (‘democratic secession’). The mainstream international law position holds that the 
right of peoples to self-determination does not accord a right to statehood, even when there 
is a democratic vote for independence or its functional equivalent.19 Certain writers claim, 
however, that a vote for independence is not irrelevant in the process of creating States.20 
Reflecting on recent events in Crimea, Anne Peters concludes that contemporary 
international law moves towards the position of requiring that all territorial realignments 
should be justified by democratic means, preferably through a territorial referendum.21 There 
is then a emergent literature highlighting the relevance of democratic decisions-making by 
the affected population in determining the future of any territory.  
 
How then are we to resolve the differences of scholarly opinion on the possibilities for 
statehood for politically ineffective peoples? In dealing with the problems that face the 
discipline, international lawyers often rely on abstract models of the international system, 
and they consider that these models should not only, or not merely, be of theoretical 
interest, but also helpful in answering the practical questions that face the discipline.22 The 
dominant way in which international lawyers have modelled the State has been by reference 
to the idea of State as Person, which explains the reliance on birth to describe the emergence of 
new States.23 The International Court of Justice has, for example, referred to the ‘birth of so 
many new States’.24 The idea of State as Person also underpins the reliance by most 
                                                
18 Reference re Secession of Quebec (1998), 2 SCR 217, paras. 103 and 143. 
19 Crawford (n 13), p. 417. 
20 See Sean Murphy, ‘Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of States and Governments’ (1999) 48 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 545, 580; and Jure Vidmar, Democratic Statehood in International Law: The Emergence of New States in Post-Cold War Practice (Oxford: 
Hart, 2013), p. 200. 
21 Anne Peters, ‘The Crimean Vote of March 2014 as an Abuse of the Institution of the Territorial Referendum’, in Christian Calliess (ed.), 
Liber amicorum Torsten Stein (2014) (SSRN), p. 8. 
22 Annelise Riles, ‘Models and Documents: Artefacts of International Legal Knowledge’ (1999) 48 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
805, 808. 
23 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), p.117. 
24 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 
(1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. 1971, p. 16, para. 52 (emphasis added).  
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international lawyers on the declaratory approach to the recognition of new States. Just like 
natural persons, States are born, and it is contrary to common sense to conclude that an 
artificial legal person can exist, or not exist, depending on the conclusions of another party.25  
 
On the ‘State as simple fact of the world’ understanding, the democratic legitimacy (or 
otherwise) of a secessionist movement would be irrelevant to any claim to statehood. The 
problem for this model is that it cannot easily explain why effectiveness is no longer the only 
relevant criterion in the identification of new States (colonial States could not maintain 
authority over territory simply by virtue of effective control and new States cannot emerge 
only be seizing control of the territory from the previous sovereign power) or explain certain 
inconvenient facts like the existence of Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, Southern 
Rhodesia, Transdniestria, and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The presence of de 
facto regimes in world society suggests that the State as Person model no longer functions 
effectively to explain the international law on statehood – a point reflected in the ever more 
complicated and controversial modifications of the definition of ‘State’ that seek to explain 
why certain ‘State-like’ entities are not, in fact, ‘States’, but without reference to the criterion 
of recognition, given that academic international lawyers, with few exceptions, follow the 
declaratory position on statehood: ‘An entity is not a State because it is recognized; it is 
recognized because it is a State’.26 
 
The challenge, then, is to find a way of modelling State that helps solve the problem of the 
identification of new States. Rather than begin with the image of Leviathan emerging as a 
natural and adult body politic, the proposition here is that we should build on developments in 
understandings in the natural sciences, as applied to the social sciences, specifically the third 
wave of systems theory thinking known complexity theory to frame State as the observation 
of the emergent patterned communications of coevolved and coexistent law and politics 
systems. The justification for this approach lies in the fact that since Hugo Grotius and 
Emmerich de Vattel, State has been conceptualized by international lawyers (if not by others) 
as an independent political community, organization in a particular territory, under a 
                                                
25 The anthropomorphic metaphor is clearest in the work of Stefan Talmon: ‘[m]uch like the birth of a child, the creation of a State is 
predominantly a question of fact’: Stefan Talmon, ‘The Constitutive Versus The Declaratory Theory of Recognition: Tertium Non Datur?’ 
(2004) 75 British Yearbook of International Law 101, 125 (emphasis added). 
26 James R Crawford, ‘State’ (2011) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, para. 44. 
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coercive system of government under the rule of law, which is not subject to the authority of 
any other political entity. State, in other words, is imagined as the coevolved and coexistent 
systems of law and politics, where the politics system is understood in terms of the adoption 
of collectively binding decisions that will be coercively enforced. This understanding is 
generally reflected (albeit expressed in different terms) in the international law literature and 
forms the basis of the Montevideo formula that defines ‘State’.27 
 
Systems theory thinking 
 
The argument from general systems theory is that we can think of any collection of 
interacting objects, actors or agents as a ‘system’, and that all systems have certain shared 
characteristics, whether we are looking at the Solar System or Criminal Justice System. The 
objective in both cases is to observe, frame and explain the patterned behaviours of the 
objects, actors or agents in the system. Given its focus on relationships between actors or 
agents, systems theory thinking has proved influential in developing our understandings of 
the functioning of human social systems. A variant developed by Niklas Luhmann 
(autopoiesis), which focuses on communications, has resonated with a number of legal 
academic, given its conceptualization of ‘law’ as a self-producing system of law 
communications. Luhmann’s closed systems theory imagines world society as a system of 
self-creating, self-maintaining and self-organizing – autopoietic – systems of communication.28 
These social systems are distinguished from the background noise of world society by virtue 
of the fact that each has its own functional specialism and its own binary coding that 
provides a positive and a negative value and through which the system creates its own 
understanding of the world from a perspective that is internal to the system.29 The only 
relevant perspective is that of the system and the only relevant observer is the system.  
 
Examples of autopoietic social systems include the law system, the politics system, the 
economic system, science, the education system, and the media. Systems of the same type 
may have different programmes, but each will have the same binary code. Law and politics 
                                                
27 (n 7). 
28 The argument is self-evidently not a literal description of the world, but a way of modelling the complexities of human social existence by 
drawing on insights from science: autopoietic social systems of communication are self-creating, self-organizing, and self-reproducing – just 
like biochemical systems (the standard example is the biological cell). 
29 See, generally, Niklas Luhmann, Theory of Society, Vols. 1 & 2, translated by Rhodes Barrett (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012 & 
2013).  
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are, according to Luhmann and others,30 autopoietic systems of communication that build 
themselves from their own communications, which then constitutes the possibilities of 
future communications. The functional specialism of law is to maintain expectations in the 
face of disappointment. The binary coding is lawful/unlawful, or law/non-law. There can be 
different systems of law (different programmes in the language of systems theory), but all 
will have the same binary code. The function of the politics system is to provide society with 
a means of making (collectively) binding decisions on political questions. The binary coding 
is governing/governed, or authority/subject. The politics system is comprised of 
communications on those issues identified as requiring the adoption of collectively binding 
decisions that will be coercively enforced. Again, there can be different types of politics 
systems, but all with the same binary code: (coercively) governing/governed.  
 
Law and politics are, in Luhmann’s terms, structurally coupled under the State Constitution:31 
politics establishes the scope of effective law norms through executive enforcement; law 
translates power into legitimate political action. State, following the logic of autopoiesis, can 
then be modelled as the space occupied (metaphorically) by an effective law system (law, 
structurally coupled with politics) and a legitimate politics system (politics, structurally 
coupled with law): State is a self-willed or self-producing entity, constituted through the emergence of 
coevolved and coexistent systems of law and politics, coupled structurally under a Constitution. 
Consequently, the boundaries of the State are not the lines we observe on a world political 
map or manifested in our experiences at passport control, but the jurisdictional space 
occupied by the overlapping system boundaries of politics and law. 
 
The closed systems model of State resonates to some extent with the traditional accounts of 
statehood in international law, which have tended to understand the State to be a self-willed 
or self-producing entity. The idea can be seen in the works, inter alios, of Thomas Hobbes, 
John Locke, and Emmerich de Vattel that seek to explain the establishment of Sovereign 
authority in the state-of-nature and in the declaratory account of recognition, which 
concludes that a community that understands itself to be a State and which establishes its 
                                                
30 See especially Gunther Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization, translated by Gareth Norbury (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012); and Chris Thornhill, A Sociology of Constitutions: Constitutions and State Legitimacy in Historical-Sociological 
Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
31 Niklas Luhmann, ‘Operational Closure And Structural Coupling: The Differentiation Of The Legal System’ (1991-2) 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 
1419, 1436.  
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factual political and legal independence is a State, subject only to the factual limits imposed by 
nature and other systems. The problem for the model from autopoiesis is that it proves 
deficient when contrasted with the extant practice of the international community, which 
does not accept that new States can emerge on their own terms (consider, for example, the 
statehood claims of Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdniestria); admits the possibility of limited 
recognition by neighbouring and other States (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia); and in the case of Kosovo allows significant disagreement as 
to whether the territory is a State, or not. In other worlds, whilst the model from autopoiesis 
might be able to explain how a law or politics system can make sense of the world in its own 
terms, it cannot anymore (if it ever could) help us to solve the practical question of the 
emergence of new States in world society.  
 
Complexity theory  
 
Niklas Luhmann’s theory of autopoiesis forms part of what Keith Sawyer calls the ‘second 
wave’ of systems theory thinking. Sawyer concludes that this second wave has been of 
limited utility in explaining the functioning of social systems, but that a ‘third wave’ 
developed since the 1990s has proved more useful. This third wave of systems theory 
thinking is focused on micro level agents, communication and social emergence, with a 
particular concern with ‘complex’ systems whose patterned behaviour cannot be understood 
to be the result of some ‘guiding hand’.32 This chapter now turns to outline the insights from 
the third wave of systems theory thinking to develop a model of State as the coupling of 
complex systems of law and politics.  
 
‘Complex adaptive systems theory’, or ‘complexity theory’, or simply ‘complexity’ emerged as 
a body of scientific thinking about certain systems in the second half of the twentieth 
century to further challenge the paradigm of a Clockwork Universe that could be taken apart 
and subjected to analysis. The prior assumption of Newtonian science was that all systems, 
even highly complicated systems, were ‘the sum of their parts’, and, like a clock, they could 
be understood by examining their component elements. The insight from scientists working 
on the weather and those looking at cells and the brain, etc. was that certain (chaotic and 
                                                
32 R. Keith Sawyer, Social Emergence: Societies as Complex Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chapter 2. 
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complex) systems could not be understood in this reductionist way. It is not possible, for 
example, to understand an ecosystem (the patterned behaviour of organisms within a 
particular space) simply by examining its constituent elements. The properties of chaotic and 
complex systems were seen to be the result of the behaviours of the individual components, 
and their interactions with each other, and their interactions with the environment outside of 
the system: the whole (of the system) was ‘greater than the sum of its parts’.  
 
Chaos theory observes that the elements of certain systems, the weather is the standard 
example, sometimes combine to produce unpredictable consequences and that small inputs 
can have disproportionately large outputs (non-linearity) – the, so-called, Butterfly effect, 
whereby the weather in Texas can be influenced by the flapping of the wings of a butterfly in 
Brazil. Both chaos and complexity have in common the idea that the patterned behaviour of 
a ‘system’ can be the result of a relatively simple set of laws followed by a large number of 
constituent agents. In chaos theory, those laws produce unpredictable outcomes and the 
system is highly sensitive to its original condition. In complexity, the actions and interactions 
of agents result in complex patterned behaviour at the edge of chaos: the place between entropy 
(where the system decays) and chaos (too much activity). The problem for the science of 
complexity is that complex systems cannot be modelled accurately because they cannot be 
simplified without losing some of their complexity. Any reductive description fails then to 
capture the full complexity and adaptability of the system, or loses some important element, 
meaning that predictions of the future shape and form of complex systems become 
impossible to make with any certainty. 
 
Complexity is more firmly established in the natural sciences, where it has been applied, for 
example, to ecosystems and the brain. The insights from complexity have also been applied 
(metaphorically) by certain social scientists to examine economic systems, the Internet, and 
the functioning of human societies, from standing ovation in the concert hall, to the 
organization of nation State societies and beyond. In all of these cases, observed patterned 
behaviour is the result of the actions and reaction of agents following rules. Consider the 
example of a game of chess: agents (the players) operate within a relatively simply set of 
rules; develop strategies within those rules; and respond to how the other players develop 
their strategies. No two games are ever the same (notwithstanding the limited set of rules) as 
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the patterns on the board emerge from the actions and reactions of the players. The same 
can be said about human societies – and the social systems that result from the actions and 
interactions of human agents, including the law system. Drawing on the insights from 
complex systems theory, this chapter now turns to develop a model of State as the framing 
of the emergent patterned communications of coevolved and coexistent law and politics 
systems – and explain the utility of the model for developing an argument for recognizing a 
right of democratic secession.  
 
Complex adaptive systems  
 
The dynamic character of a complex system is provided by the facts of emergence and self-
organization. Emergence reflects the idea that patterned behaviour is a consequence of the 
actions of individual components following certain rules; self-organization that patterned 
behaviour is not the result of some central controller or guiding hand, but a consequence of 
individual agents responding to the unpredictability of emergence in a search for stability.33 
The capacity for self-organisation allows complex systems to change their internal structures 
in response to developments within the system and events in the external environment. The 
structure of the system (the positions, actions and reactions of agents) occurs spontaneously 
as the result of the interactions of the parts of the system as they react to the flow of 
information through the system: there is no central controller or guiding hand in a complex 
system. The capacity for self-organization is the property of a complex system that enables it 
to process and make sense of information in order to develop or change in response to 
changes in the environment.  
 
Emergence is the key attribute of complexity. The patterns observed in a complex systems are 
the result of the actions and interactions of networks of agents. It is important to be clear 
that emergence is not random patterned behaviour: emergence reflects the idea that the 
interactions between the component agents and their interactions with actors outside the 
system and the wider environment can produce unexpected consequences. This is 
particularly the case as complex systems are non-linear: small inputs can have 
                                                
33 See generally Melanie Mitchell, Complexity: A Guided Tour (New York, Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 12-13; also Neil Johnson, 
Simply Complexity: A Clear Guide to Complexity Theory (London: Oneworld Publications, 2009), pp. 13-16; and Paul Cilliers, ‘What Can We 
Learn From A Theory Of Complexity?’ (2000) 2 Emergence 23, 24. 
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disproportionately large effects (the Butterfly effect), and an apparently stable system can 
change suddenly in unpredictable ways. Emergence is, then, focused on the properties of the 
system that cannot be deduced from examining the component elements.34 
 
The basic components of a complex adaptive system are called agents. The term refers to 
actors able to respond to other agents and to the external environment. The key point is that 
agents are, to some degree, autonomous, whilst operating in accordance with certain rules.35 
When agents ‘react’ they do so in a thinking way, based on a collective memory contained 
within the system. Complex systems learn through the processing of information by agents 
and the presence of negative and positive feedback loops. Complex systems are also learning 
systems. This is an emergent property of the system: as the interactions of agents create new 
patterns in response to new information, the system can be said to have ‘learnt’ and adapted 
and evolved. In order to adapt, evolve and change – and not simply ‘mirror’ its environment, 
the system must have a memory, and therefore a history.36 Learning is not possible without 
some form of memory that contains information important to the existence of the system, 
which is stored and dispersed throughout the system (even the most simple social animal 
must be able to distinguish friend from foe). The history of the system helps to determine its 
structure, representing the memory of the system of the processes of self-organization that 
resulted in its extant structure and processes. That memory also constrains the system’s 
possible futures: the idea of path dependency. 
 
As well as co-operating and competing with other agents within their locale, agents may be 
influenced directly by external actors and elements. In other words, complex systems are open 
systems. This makes the identification of the boundaries of a complex system particularly 
problematic. Take the example of the paradigmatic complex system: a rainforest ecosystem. 
As a result of the incompressibility (a complex system cannot be simplified without losing 
some element that makes them complex) and openness of the system (agents in the 
ecosystem sometimes interact directly with elements in the external environment), any 
description of the rainforest ecosystem and its boundaries inevitably involves the making of 
                                                
34 Jeffrey Goldstein, ‘Emergence as a Construct: History and Issues’ (1999) 1 Emergence 49, 58. 
35 Francis Heylighen, Paul Cilliers and Carlos Gershenson, ‘Philosophy and complexity’ in Jan Bogg and Robert Geyer (eds.) Complexity, 
Science and Society (Oxford: Radcliffe Pub., 2007) 117, 125. 
36 Paul Cilliers, Complexity and Postmodernism: Understanding Complex Systems (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 91-92. 
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choices as to what is ‘system’ and what is ‘not system’. This process of separating is called 
framing – and it is undertaken by an observer.37 Any description of a complex system 
concerns, then, both the fact of patterned behaviour and the making of choices by those 
framing the system. 
 
The complex systems of law and politics 
 
Complex systems have the following characteristics: agents follow rules, but act with some 
autonomy; agents are in a network of relationships; the patterned behaviours of agents can 
be framed as a system; system characteristics are not derived only from the actions of agents; 
agents act and react, relying on information within and outside system; the system therefore 
evolves without any guiding hand; system memory constrains future possibilities. The 
argument here is that systems of law and politics can be understood as complex systems and 
modelled as patterned communications between authorities and subjects. Consider the law 
system. Law is self-organizing: there is no central controller or guiding hand – neither the 
legislature or supreme court is able to control the shape and form of the entire system. The 
law system is the emergent, undirected, pattern of normative communications framed in 
terms of law adopted by authorities and applied to subjects. It is the result of the 
communicative actions of a large network of agents (legislatures, courts, judges, lawyers, 
litigants and others) capable of responding to other actors and other systems, which operate 
with no overall guiding hand. The law system can, then, be mapped, or modelled, as a 
pattern of law normative communications between legal authorities and the subjects of the 
law regime: ‘It is unlawful for X to kill Y’, ‘It is unlawful for A to break their contractual 
arrangement with B’, etc., etc.  
 
The patterned communications of the law system are a consequence of the actions and 
reactions of law-actors, with the legal system representing the ‘memory’ of previous actions 
and interactions and providing ‘feedback’ to law-agents, who operate in accordance with 
certain rules: higher courts bind lower courts, rules are interpreted logically and in 
accordance with precedent, etc. Information flows through the system; its source can be 
internal or external. Memory is distributed throughout: in statutes, court judgments, 
                                                
37 Ibid., p. 4. 
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academic textbooks, etc. That memory of the law system limits the possibilities of future 
communications (path dependency).38 This is clearest in the practice of the common law,39 
and related judicial principle of stare decisis.40 A law system evolves and maintains its fitness by 
adapting to developments within the system and in the wider environment, and by 
accommodating itself with other law systems. Law agents exchange information and the law 
system is able to rely on feedback loops and use information from within the system and 
from other law systems in order to adapt and change (consider the way in which legal 
systems in Europe have accommodated themselves to the emergence of the law system of 
the European Union). In its evolution, the law system builds on the collective memory of 
the system, but in ways that cannot be predicted as constitutions are revised or replaced,41 
legislatures adopt radical law reform, and supreme courts overturn long-established 
precedent. Any event (often unforeseen events) can influence the future shape of the law 
system in unexpected and significant ways. Finally, law systems are open systems: their 
boundaries have the characteristic of porous legality and it is not always easy to determine to 
which system a law norm communication belongs.42  
 
The politics system at the level of the State can also be understood as a complex system.43 
The politics system is the emergent patterned system of communications adopted by those 
in power to the subjects of the political regime. Politics is the pattern of regulatory 
communications concerned with the adoption of collective binding decisions by the 
government in relation to the governed. There is no single guiding hand or omnipotent 
power in the State: regulations can be adopted by legislatives, executives and administrative 
bodies. Collectively binding decisions emerge through the processing of information by 
agents within the system, often relying on feedback loops. The politics system has its own 
memory, which limits the possible scope of future decisions, and its own ways of thinking. 
                                                
38 J.B. Ruhl, ‘Law’s Complexity: A Primer 2007-2008 24 Georgia State University Law Review 885, 894-5.  
39 On the idea of the common law as a complex system, see Daniel M. Katz et al., ‘Social Architecture, Judicial Peer Effects And The 
‘Evolution’ Of The Law: Toward A Positive Theory Of Judicial Social Structure’ (2007-2008) 24 Georgia State University Law Review 977 (and 
references cited). See also J.B. Ruhl, ‘The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its 
Practical Meaning for Democracy’ (1996) 49 Vanderbilt Law Review 1407, 1471. 
40 On path dependency and stare decisis, see Oona A. Hathaway, ‘Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a 
Common Law System’ (2000-2001) 86 Iowa Law Review 601, 
41 Donald T. Hornstein, ‘Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law’ (2005) 54 Duke Law Journal 913, 932. 
42 The idea of porous legality, or interlegality, is common in the literature on legal anthropology. The phenomenon has also been observed 
in colonial and post-colonial settings; in relation to new forms of pluralism within the State; and in the areas of transnational and other 
forms of global governance. The term ‘interlegality’ is taken from Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, 
Globalization, and Emancipation, 2nd ed. (London: Butterworths, 2002). 
43 For a useful introduction to complexity applied to the politics system, see Robert Geyer and Samir Rihani, Complexity and Public Policy: A 
New Approach to 21st Century Politics, Policy and Society (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2012). 
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Political systems can, though, change in unexpected ways (often quickly) – consider the 
democratic revolutions during the so-called ‘Arab Spring’.44 To survive, a politics system 
must adapt and evolve with the systems of world society. Politics systems are also open 
systems, interacting with other politics systems and political communications at one level can 
form part of the politics system at another – consider the way in which global political 
communications are part of domestic political communications, concerning, for example, 
military and humanitarian interventions, climate change, and commitments for overseas 
development assistance. 
 
Modelling ‘State’ as complex systems of law and politics  
 
The concept of State is understood by international lawyers in terms of coevolved and 
coexistent law and politics systems: an independent political community under a coercive 
system of government under the rule of law, which is not subject to the authority of any 
other political entity. The insight from complexity is that these law and politics systems are 
emergent, undirected systems. How, then, do we model ‘State’ against the background noise 
of world society in conditions of complexity? The first requirement is to separate each 
system from the environment of world society. The idea of a complex system presupposes the 
existence of a boundary that distinguishes ‘system’ and ‘not-system’. If we understand world 
society in terms of communications, we can observe patterns of communications that we 
would recognize as ‘law’ and ‘politics’. We can, further, frame networked communications as 
law systems and politics systems. The boundaries of these systems are not, however, to be 
understood as enjoying an ‘objective’ reality, or as being established only by the operations  
of the system (in contradistinction to autopoiesis). Boundaries are simultaneously a function 
of the activity of the system (there must be patterned behaviour that can be observed) and 
the product of the strategy of description involved in the act of observation when separating 
the system from its environment.  
 
Any description of a complex system involves the making of choices by those observing the 
system. Different observers may frame the patterned communications differently, depending 
on their strategic and cognitive frames: constitutional lawyers see domestic law norms; 
                                                
44 See, generally, Seva Gunitsky, ‘Complexity and Theories of Change in International Politics’ (2013) 5 International Theory 35.  
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international lawyers see international law norms, for example. Where there is more than one 
observer, there may be multiple perspectives on the existence and scope of the system (and 
no reason to conclude that each observer will see the same version of the system) or to prefer 
one version or vision of the system and its boundary to another. It is then difficult to be 
absolutely certain of the position of the boundaries of law and politics systems in world 
society. Importantly, there are no objective boundaries – the act of framing involves the 
making of choices – and it is impossible for the observer to avoid the responsibility of 
choosing, i.e. deciding which norms are inside the system and which norms are outside the 
system. Once we recognize that law and politics are complex systems, we must reject (as an 
observed reality) the argument that a political entity (understood as the coevolved and 
coexistent systems of law and politics) capable of establishing its independence with the will 
to be a State is a State. State is not a fact of the world simpliciter: it is fact of the world 
observed through the cognitive frame of international law. 
 
In the identification of new States, the following insights from complexity theory emerge. 
First, there must be patterned communications. Complex systems are not merely a function of 
observation. We must be able to see co-emergent and coexistent systems of law and politics. 
Second, there must be an observer to distinguish the patterned communications of the law and 
politics systems from the background noise of world society. This is done through the 
framing of communications of the same type, that is by framing the pattern of law 
communications coded lawful/ unlawful (or law/ non-law) issued by authorities to subjects 
and the pattern of communications issued by the government to the governed on collective 
biding decisions that will be coercively enforced. It follows that the ‘existence’ of the 
complex systems of law and politics is both a function of the system (reflected in patterned 
communications) and the act of observation. Third, given the inherent indeterminacy in the 
modelling and observation of complex systems, there may be multiple perspectives on the 
system and its boundary, and no reason to privilege the perspective of one observer over any 
other.  
 
State, following the logic of complexity, is the observation of the patterned communications of the 
coevolved and coexistent law and politics systems. Where the law system and politics system are 
observed to be coexistent, then, according to the Montevideo formula, the territory subject to 
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the normative communications of the law and politics systems has a prima facie claim to be a 
State. Where they are not observed to be co-existent, the political entity is not a State. Given 
the incompressibility and open nature of the complex systems of law and politics, different 
actors may come to different conclusions, depending on their cognitive frame and 
interpretation of the observed patterned communications, i.e. as to whether an emergent 
‘Sovereign’ entity can be seen. The approach from complexity leads, then, inevitably to a 
defence of the constitutive position on statehood: the legal status of State is constructed by 
way of recognition by already existing States.45 State is the observation of the law and politics 
systems ‘coupled’ under a Constitution.  
 
Legitimate political authority and democratic secession 
 
We have, then, our abstract model of State: the observation of the emergent patterned communications 
of coevolved and coexistent law and politics systems. To observe a State, international lawyers must 
be able to ‘see’ coevolved and coexistent systems of law and politics against the background 
noise of world society. This is achieved through the identification of communications 
systems by observing their function and binary coding. The law system is the pattern of 
normative communications coded lawful/not-lawful, which are promulgated by recognized 
authorities and applied to subjects. This definition is clearly contestable, but, for the most 
part, controversies in relation to the international status of a political entity do not concern 
the question as to whether it has a system of ‘law’ – although this point has been central to 
arguments before the European Court of Human Rights as to whether the de facto regime 
of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is a sovereign political entity.46 The focus, then, is 
on the politics system – as observed by State and non-state actors in the international 
community.  
 
From the time of Hugo Grotius, it has been accepted that the overall approach of the 
international law system to the regulation of world society emerges through the exercise of 
Sovereigns’ wills, i.e. there is no guiding hand (international law is the paradigmatic complex 
law system). In the period since the adoption of the United Nations Charter, that emergent 
                                                
45 See Hans Kelsen, ‘Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations’ (1941) 35 American Journal of International Law 605. 
46 See, for example, Protopapa v Turkey, App. No. 16084/90, judgment 24 February 2009.  
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teleology has undergone a process of transformation, in part through the recognition of the 
right of peoples to political self-determination, but also in the adoption of numerous 
international human rights law instruments, indicating a move away from the Hobbesian 
notion of the politics system as coercively binding decisions, to politics as a system of 
legitimate authority accepted by subjects. Legitimate political authority is manifested in the 
adoption of positive laws accepted (unthinkingly) by subjects. To be accepted by subjects, 
authority systems must develop, and act in a manner consistent with, a legitimation narrative. 
Without this, government is nothing more that the exercise of naked power.  
 
The idea of practical authority developed by Joseph Raz explains the way in which the 
legitimating narratives of political authorities function. This account of practical authority 
relies on four inter-related theses: the dependence thesis, which provides that authority is 
legitimate where undertaken in accordance with the reasons that already apply to subjects; 
pre-emption thesis – the directives of legitimate authorities establish content-independent 
reasons for action; normal justification thesis, which establishes that the exercise of 
normative power is only legitimate where the authority is better placed than subjects to 
establish regulatory directives; and independence thesis – on some issues it will be more 
important for individuals to decide for themselves than to decide correctly. The key is the 
normal justification thesis. Raz argues that the normal way of establishing authority is to 
demonstrate to the subjects of authority directives accept that they would better conform to 
the reasons that (already) apply to them by following the directives of the authority than by 
acting independently.47 The reasons for accepting the authority of another include that the 
authority is more knowledgeable; is more likely to make a correct decision; and accepting the 
authority of another allows for effective co-ordination. Once established, the directives of a 
legitimate authority are binding on those subjects within its jurisdiction.  
 
The requirement for practical authority is a consequence of the identification of co-
ordination and collective action problems by a number of individuals. It follows that before 
an actor, institution or system can satisfy the normal justification criterion (i.e. regulate in the 
interests of subjects), it must be recognized or accepted as an authority by a large number of 
persons who do actually accept that the relevant actor, institution or system satisfies the 
                                                
47 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 53. 
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normal justification criterion in cases of co-ordination over matters of common concern. 
The exercise of normative power by the State is, then, legitimate where the State is more 
likely than the individual to establish a social norm or convention that regulates the 
behaviour of the individual and others in accordance with the background reasons that 
already apply to the subjects of authority directives taken individually. Where the individual 
subjects accept the authority of the politics system of the State, the system is an authority for 
them.48  
 
Raz’ account of the justification for authority establishes a significant break with the social 
contract tradition that has dominated the discourse around legitimate political power. 
Authority is not established at some hypothetical foundational moment of agreement that 
binds subsequent generations. According to Raz’ account, subjects will only accept the 
authority of the regime where it governs, or at least claims to govern, in their interests at this 
point in time. The only reasons that an authority may take into account in determining the 
content of authority directives are those that already apply to actually existing subjects, 
including the requirement for co-operation on a wide range of issues – and that subjects 
recognize this is the case. Raz’ idea of practical authority allows us to develop a model a 
democratic secession in three related steps:49 first, the rejection of the sovereign authority of 
the territorial State by certain subjects; second, the acceptance of the authority of the 
emergent, undirected, systems of law and politics coupled under the constitution of a new 
political entity; and, finally, the observation (or ‘recognition’) of the political entity as 
possessing legitimate political authority in relation to its ‘subjects’.  
 
(1) The rejection of the authority of the State 
 
Legitimate political authority depends on the development of a narrative by the politics 
system – and the acceptance of that narrative by the subjects of the regime taken 
                                                
48 In the case of the political authorities of the State, Raz concludes that the requirement to solve co-ordination problems means that they 
should be in a position of ‘real power’, i.e. de jure political authorities should also be de facto authorities, and that this will require the use of 
coercive force to ensure compliance with authority directives: Joseph Raz, ‘The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception’ 
(2006) 90 Minnesota Law Review 1003, 1036.  
49 Compare, however, Raz’ well known position recognizing a collective right to self-determination for those (ethno-cultural) groups that 
provide secure identity and belonging to members. The objective is to secure the necessary conditions for the prosperity and self-respect of 
the group. The right to self-determination is limited only by the requirement that the encompassing group commit itself to the protection 
of basic human rights and exercises its right to self-determination in a manner that limits any damage to already existing States: Avishai 
Margalit and Joseph Raz, ‘National self-determination’ (1990) 87 The Journal of Philosophy 439. 
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individually. There are two parts to the equation, and both can provide the grounds for 
secession: the State can repudiate the bonds of authority by failing to govern in the interests 
of some or all of the subjects of the regime; or some or all of the subjects can reject the 
authority of the State. In relation to the first possibility (government not in the interests of 
subjects), self-evidently where the exercise of power makes no pretence to be in the interests 
of those targeted by the regulatory regime (tyranny, occupation, etc.), ‘subjects’ are released 
from the bonds of authority by the simple reason that the political institutions are not an 
authority for them. This is explained in legal doctrine and political theory in terms of a right 
of revolution, or right of rebellion, etc.  
 
The idea that ‘subjects’ are released from the bonds of authority where the State manifestly 
makes no attempt to govern in their interests resonates with the ‘remedial right’ of secession 
outlined by Allen Buchanan, which concludes that such a right exists in cases of persistent 
and grave injustice, defined in terms of genocide or massive violations of basic human 
rights.50 Buchanan later supplements these criteria with that of the persistent violation of 
intrastate autonomy agreements, which he links to serious ethnic conflict.51 In a similar vein, 
Alan Patten’s ‘failure of recognition’ criterion concludes that a claim to secede should be 
accepted where the State has failed to introduce constitutional arrangements that 
accommodate the distinctive ethno-cultural identity of the relevant group.52 In both cases 
(and in the language of practical authority), the State cannot claim authority in relation to 
certain persons with the State, for the reason that the legitimation narrative established by 
the politics system makes no attempt to govern in their interests or to accommodate the 
distinctive identity of those persons – distinguished from the majority on national, ethnic, 
religious and linguistic grounds.  
 
The second possibility is to recognize a right of the subjects of the State (taken individually) 
to reject the authority of the State. Secession can then be understood in terms of the 
repudiation of the political authority of the territorial State by certain subjects of the regime, 
i.e. it is challenge to the boundaries of its authority. (This explains why the constituency in 
                                                
50 Allen Buchanan, ‘Theories of Secession’ (1997) 26 Philosophy & Public Affairs 31. 
51 Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations of International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 
351-2. 
52 Alan Patten, ‘Democratic secession from a multinational state’ (2002) 112 Ethics 558, 563. 
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any self-determination referendum comprises those persons in the self-determination unit 
only, and not the population of the territorial State as a whole.) Buchanan and Patten both 
reject the idea of a choice-based or democratic right of secession, which is triggered by the 
decision of a group to leave the State, with nothing more required. This stance is common in 
the literature, and few writers argue for the recognition of what Susanna Mancini refers to as 
a political–territorial right to secession ‘legitimated by aggregated individual choices.’53 Harry 
Beran, for example, concludes that liberal political philosophy permits secession where it is 
desired by a territorially concentrated group, provided that the secession ‘is morally and 
practically possible.’54 Practical considerations might include the size of the group and 
whether the group is located on the periphery of the territorial State. Moral considerations 
are often grounded in empirical, risk-based considerations: the dangers to peace and security; 
the possibility of unjust terms of separation; and the unpredictable and possibly deleterious 
consequences of establishing a precedent for non-voluntary secession. Where justice is a 
relevant criterion, it often concerns the obligations that flow from the secessionist unit to the 
remainder of the territorial State,55 including the obligations from social justice to other 
citizens where the separatist territory is wealthier than the rest of the State. The logic of 
secession is also said to point to a prohibition on secession from liberal States by illiberal 
groups. 
 
Whilst it would be naïve not to recognize the potential dangers to peace and human security 
in accepting a democratic right of secession (and likewise in the repression of separatist 
movements – the opposing empirical, risk-based consideration), the burden of proof, as Kai 
Nielsen observes, is on those arguing that the moral right of democratic secession should be 
overridden.56 To put it another way: the burden rests with those seeking to justify the 
imposition of coercive governmental authority on unwilling subjects. By way of 
contradistinction, the argument here follows the logic of legitimate political authority: the 
State must govern in the interests of subjects and develop a legitimation narrative to explain 
how it is governing in their interests – and the subjects of the politics system must recognize 
                                                
53 Susanna Mancini, ‘Secession and Self-Determination’, in Michel Rosenfeld and Andras Sajo (eds.), The Oxford Handbook Of Comparative 
Constitutional Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012) 481, 484-5. 
54 Harry Beran, ‘A Liberal Theory of Secession’ (1984) 32 Political Studies 21, 23. See also Daniel Philpott, ‘In Defense of Self-
Determination’ (1995) 105 Ethics 352, 382. 
55 See, for example, Christopher H. Wellman, ‘A Defense of Secession and Political Self-Determination’ (1995) 24 Philosophy & Public Affairs 
142, 161-2: ‘any group may secede as long as it and its remainder state are large, wealthy, cohesive, and geographically contiguous enough 
to form a government that effectively performs the functions necessary to create a secure political environment.’ 
56 Kai Nielsen, ‘Liberal Nationalism, Liberal Democracies, and Secession’ (1998) 48 University of Toronto Law Journal 253, 253.  
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that this is the case. Where the subjects of the politics system do not accept that this is the 
case, then the State is not an authority for them. The decision to accept or reject the 
authority of the State is one for each individual targeted by the authority directives of the 
State. The choice cannot be made by others, especially not by a majority of the subjects of 
the regime. This ability to accept or reject the authority of the State operates on a simple 
binary divide. Where a subject accepts the authority of the coevolved and coexistent systems 
of law and politics, the State is an authority for them. Where they do not, the State is not an 
authority.57 It is, then, possible for a number of subjects to reject the authority of a 
government that enjoys legitimate authority in relation to other parts of the population. The 
basis for this lies in the rejection of the legitimation narrative developed by the constitutional 
State: nothing more is required. 
 
(2) The establishment of a new de facto authorities  
 
There are three circumstances in which the idea of legitimate authority allows for the 
subjects of the State to be released from the bonds of authority. First, where the State has 
undergone a process of dissolution, for example in the case of the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia. In these exceptional circumstances, there is factually no politics system 
claiming authority over the subjects of the State – in other words, there is an authority 
vacuum that can be filled by other systems of authority. Second, where the State make no 
pretence to govern in the interests of some or all of the population, the government is not 
an authority for the relevant subjects. Third, any subject of an authority regime can reject the 
legitimation narrative of the politics system as it is applied to them – subjects can create an 
authority vacuum in relation to themselves.  
 
Within the unoccupied governance space created by the loss of authority of the territorial 
State, it is possible for subjects to recognize and accept emergent systems of law and politics 
under a new constitution: this is the way in which constituent power is exercised by subjects. 
Whilst the acceptance (or rejection) of authority is a question for the individual, the 
establishment of authorities must be seen as a collective endeavour, as the requirement for 
                                                
57 The argument applies both to the fact of authority and the scope of authority. For the implications of this, see Steven Wheatley, 
‘Conceptualizing the Authority of the Sovereign State over Indigenous Peoples’ (2014) 27 Leiden Journal of International Law 371. 
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practical authorities follows the identification of co-ordination and collective action 
problems by a group of individuals. Given that Raz’ conception of practical authority 
concerns the exercise of normative power in relation to individuals capable of deciding 
whether, and on what grounds, they should accept a claim to authority (i.e. it concerns 
subjects capable of understanding and responding to arguments supported by reasons), the 
collective determination to accept a new authority must logically be undertaken on the basis 
of reasoned deliberation. This applies both as between the authority and subjects, and 
between subjects themselves: the determination to establish or recognize an authority 
follows a collective act of political will-formation grounded in reasoned public deliberations 
in which all voices count equally.  
 
In practical politics, the determination by a group of persons to establish an authority regime 
will normally be made by way of an independence referendum, although other proxy 
measures may be permitted in exceptional circumstances – a declaration of independence by 
a representative body with popular support, or the results of a general election showing 
popular support for autonomy or independence. In relation to the standards required of the 
referendum, the international law on elections can be taken as establishing the basic 
principles and procedures.58 There are, though, particular requirements in relation to 
referendums.59 The question on the ballot paper must be sufficiently clear to establish the 
will of the people. The process should specify in advance what majority of the vote will be 
required and the required turnout of voters. There should also be international observation 
on the vote and the period of democratic debate preceding the vote. In the period leading up 
to the vote on independence there is a need for inclusive, informed, and effective public 
debate, requiring a free media; the neutrality of political institutions; the participation of as 
many citizens as possible; limited involvement of external forces; and a long timescale 
leading up to the vote.60 This period of time may also allow for the territorial State to revise 
                                                
58 Yves Beigbeder, ‘Referendum’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, para. 46.  
59 On the conditions for independence referendums, see The Venice Commission’s Guidelines for Constitutional Referendums at National 
Level CDL-INF (2001)10; and Guidelines on the Holding of Referendums (CDL-AD(2007)008.  
60 See Stephen Tierney, Constitutional Referendums: The Theory and Practice of Republican Deliberation (Oxford: OUP Oxford, 2012), chapter 10. 
Whilst Tierney is primarily concerned with referendums in democratic States, the conclusions can also be applied more generally to the 
conduct of independence referendums. 
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its constitutional narrative of political legitimacy in a way that is able to accommodate the 
aspirations of the members of the group making the decision on separation.61 
 
(3) International recognition  
 
An emergent political entity in world politics can be modelled in terms of a constitutional 
order that represents the coevolved and coexistent systems of law and politics, with coercive 
institutions of government. A political entity has a prima facie claim to be recognized as a 
State where its law and politics systems are observed to be coexistent. An absence of 
controversy concerning statehood reflects a consensus between the political entity, the 
territorial State and other already existing States, and wider international community on the 
observation of coexistent law and politics systems. Divergent positions reflect different 
conclusions on the claims of the law and politics systems to autonomy and authority.  
 
The identification of new States requires that we distinguish the patterned communications 
of law and politics (coupled under a constitution) from the background noise of world 
society. The analysis developed from complexity demonstrates the importance of the third 
party observer in the ‘recognition’ of the systems of law and politics – and consequently in 
the recognition of new States. In the identification of new States, the requirement to 
distinguish the patterned communications of the law and politics systems from the 
background noise of world society requires a conception of how international law 
understands the politics system. The traditional doctrine and practice of international law has 
understood the political system in terms of the coercive enforcement of binding decisions. 
This is no longer the case. The period of the United Nations has seen the 
reconceptualization by international law of  the politics system in terms of legitimate political 
power, reflected inter alia in the development of international laws on the self-determination 
of peoples and human rights of individuals.  
 
The emergence of the right of peoples to self-determination signalled an ethical turn in 
international law, from ‘statehood as effectiveness’ to ‘statehood as legitimate political 
                                                
61 Consider, for example, the promises of greater autonomy and devolution of powers made by the leaders of the main political parties in 
the United Kingdom in the run-up to the vote on independence in Scotland: Severin Carrell, ‘Scotland promised extra tax and legal powers 
for referendum no vote’, The Guardian (London) 5 August 2014.  
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authority’. Politics is observed as a system of communications with an underlying 
legitimation narrative framed in terms of government in the interests of the subjects of the 
regime. (Where this is not the case, international law speaks in terms of occupation forces, 
illegal regimes, etc.) Where politics is understood in terms of a legitimate authority accepted 
by subjects, certain regimes will simply not count as politics systems – the racist political 
regime in Southern Rhodesia following its Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 is 
the paradigm case. The international community (or at least a majority of the members of 
the international community) does not see a pattern of political communications between 
government and governed, i.e. a politics systems (properly understood) – and consequently 
cannot see a State, even if it can see the exercise of coercive power and an effective legal 
regime.  
 
State is the observed fact of emergent systems of law and politics, coupled under a 
Constitution. International law no longer understands the politics system only in terms of 
the coercive enforcement of governmental power, but also legitimate political authority. 
Whilst the international law system does not impose substantive requirements on the politics 
systems of the government of new States (with the possible exception of regimes 
underpinned by a racist ideology, for example Southern Rhodesia and the South African 
‘Bantustans’), it does require that new States emerge with the consent of the population to 
be governed by the new regime. It follows, then, that in order to be recognized as a new 
State, a political entity must demonstrate that its politics system enjoys the support of the 
relevant population taken individually. The only way in which this can be definitively 
established is through the holding of an independence referendum, or its functional 
equivalent. In other words, the international law system restricts the possibility for the 
establishment of sovereign independence to political communities established in accordance 
with the popular or ‘democratic’ will of the people: ‘We the people’ being defined by 
reference to a political community of deliberative equals, and not the ethnic, religious and 
linguistic ties that bind human societies. That being the case, the conclusion raises the 
question as to the salience of nationalism in the structuring of political power in world 




A choice-based or democratic right of secession 
 
The arguments developed in the previous sections lead inevitably to the conclusion that the 
emergent international law teleology, focused increasingly on the idea of legitimate political 
authority, can accommodate a right of democratic secession. First, the authority of the 
territorial State can be ‘removed’ by way of an independence referendum held in conditions 
of considered, open and free democratic debate. The requirement is straightforwardly 
applied in the normal conditions of democratic politics. In situations of violence and civil 
war, and only where the authority vacuum is created by the collapse of the central authorities 
or operation of the remedial ‘saving clause’ (when political institutions make no attempt to 
function as legitimate authorities), proxy measures to determine the will of the people may 
be relied upon, including the results of previous elections and decisions of representative 
bodies with popular support.  
 
Second, a positive vote in the independence referendum can be taken as expressing the 
desire of a majority of the population of the territory to establish a sovereign and 
independent State – and to accept the authority of law and politics systems of the new State. 
This new political entity must not only demonstrate that it has the support of a majority of 
the population of the relevant territorial group, but also that its legitimating narrative can be 
accepted by all those that are to be subjected to its regulatory directives (hence the 
importance of minority guarantees when new States are established). Where the proposed 
legitimating narrative of the new State does not seek to accommodate the interests of all 
putative subjects, there is a strong argument for the holding of a fragmentary plebiscite, in 
which different parts of the self-determination unit can opt for different outcomes,62 mindful 
of the requirement of territorial contiguousness and cohesion for the territorial State and any 
new State.  The possibilities of ‘fragmenting’ the separatist territory should be clearly 
outlined in advance of any vote on independence.63  
 
                                                
62 See, for example, the ‘separation’ of the canton of Jura from that of Bern in Switzerland in 1979: Mancini (n 16) 580-1.  
63 At a late stage in the independence referendum campaign in Scotland, it was suggested that Shetland might be treated differently from 
the rest of the territory: Esther Addley, ‘Shetland may reconsider its place in Scotland after yes vote, says minister’, The Guardian (London), 
17 September 2014.  
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The international law right of peoples to political self-determination is a fundamental norm 
of the international community. The scope and content of the norm remain opaque, 
however, when applied beyond the colonial context remain. The argument here is that the 
decision to hold a referendum on independence gives concrete meaning to the content of 
the right in the particular context, i.e. it cannot be read across to other situations. A positive 
vote for independence signals the rejection of the authority of the State by one part of the 
population, and the determination to establish a new State. That population – or ‘people’ – 
has an international law right to political self-determination now understood as a presumptive 
claim to statehood, opposable to the territorial State, which must engage with the separatist 
territory, in a meaningful way, in order to facilitate its right to political self-determination, 
understood as sovereign independence, or some other status acceptable to a majority of the 
population. The obligation on the State to facilitate the right of peoples to political self-
determination is owed both to the relevant population and to all other States in international 
community, erga omnes.64  
 
The international law obligation of the State to engage with the separatist territory cannot be 
understood as according a  right to statehood. State is the observed fact of coexistent law and 
politics systems, where the politics system is framed in terms of communications on 
collectively binding decisions that will be coercively enforced. In the absence of de facto coercive 
power over the subjects of the politics system, an entity does not have a claim to statehood. 
The right of a people that has voted for independence is the right to a process leading to the 
establishment of a sovereign and independent State. Where the territorial State rejects the 
possibility of independence or imposes unreasonable conditions or restrictions on the 
establishment of sovereign independence, it is in breach of its international law obligations 
to engage in good faith with the separatist entity. This cannot be understood as authorizing 
the use of force by outside States to facilitate the sovereignty and independence of the 
territory, except in the exceptional circumstances envisaged by the ‘saving clause’ doctrine. 
The use of military force under the Charter of the United Nations is regulated by its own lex 
specialis, and with the exception of an application of the (related and contested) ‘saving clause’ 
and humanitarian intervention doctrines, the right to use military force is not triggered by a 
                                                
64 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion ICJ Rep. 
2004, p. 136, para. 88. 
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violation of the international law right of peoples to self-determination. A violation of the 
right, through a failure to engage in the process leading to independence, will, however, 
engage the responsibility of the territorial State, and allow other States to introduce non-





The focus of this chapter has been the possibility of developing a model of democratic 
secession consistent with the emergent teleology of an international law system increasingly 
focused on the idea of legitimate political authority. In order to develop an argument for 
recognizing a such a right, the work outlined an abstract conceptual model of world society 
to explain the emergence of new States. Drawing on developments in the natural sciences 
through an application of the third wave of systems theory thinking know as complexity, it 
outlined a model of State as the framing of the emergent patterned communications of 
coevolved and coexistent law and politics systems. In contradistinction to much of the 
systems theory literature, law and politics were understood to be complex systems: the 
patterned communications of the systems is a consequence of the actions of constituent 
agents; their interactions with each other; and interactions with other actors and systems in 
the external environment. A focus on the nature of the politics systems – understood 
through the cognitive frame of international law – allowed us to develop an argument that 
supports the right of democratic secession in three related steps: the rejection of the 
sovereign authority of the territorial State by certain subjects; the acceptance of the authority 
of emergent systems of law and politics of the new political entity; and observation (or 
‘recognition’) of the political entity as possessing legitimate political authority.  
 
At the time of writing, 65 three self-determination events focused on the idea of democratic 
separation or secession are dominating the media: the referendum on Scottish independence 
has produced a vote in favour of Scotland remaining part of the United Kingdom;66 Crimea 
has seemingly become a federal subject within the Russian Federation, following a 
                                                
65 September 2014. 
66 ‘Scottish referendum: Scotland votes “No” to independence’, BBC News Website, 19 September 2014. Available 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-29270441 (last visited 25 September 2014).  
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referendum, although this possibility has been rejected by the international community;67 and 
the Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic in eastern Ukraine have 
declared their independence (again following hastily arranged and badly organized 
referendums), although neither not been recognized by any State, including Russia.68 Had 
Scotland voted for independence, it would not seem implausible to argue that the people of 
Scotland would enjoy a right to statehood opposable to the United Kingdom. Yet, no 
serious academic argues that the Ukrainian regions of Crimea, Donetsk or Luhansk have a 
right to statehood, and (subsequently and consequently) the right to determine their own 
status, including by way of union with Russia. This is the case notwithstanding the fact that 
the regions have voted for independence.69 How, then, do we evaluate the claims of the 
Crimea, Donetsk or Luhansk regions: deny any right of democratic secession; reject the idea 
of remedial right of secession in case it is misused (as seems the case here);70 or simply ask 
whether the regions have ‘safely and permanently’ managed to exclude the authority of 
Ukraine, without the level of external support prohibited by international law?71  
 
An application of the model developed in this chapter would recognize a general right of 
democratic secessions for the populations (‘peoples’) of Crimea, Donetsk or Luhansk, but 
reject the claims to independence by the Ukrainian regions by way of democratic secession 
in the particular circumstances – not because those populations do not have a right to self-
determination or must subject themselves to the authority of the Ukrainian State, but as a 
consequence of the failure of the authorities and the populations to engage in reasoned, 
democratic deliberations concerning the allocation of political authority in the region. Simply 
put: the situation in the Crimea, Donetsk or Luhansk regions cannot be understood as an 
                                                
67 See GA Res. A/68/L39 of 27 March 2014, ‘Territorial Integrity of Ukraine’, at para. 5, which asserted that the independence referendum 
for Crimea, ‘having no validity, cannot form the basis for any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea’: also, Council 
of Europe’s Venice Commission’s Opinion on “Whether the decision taken by the supreme council of the autonomous republic of Crimea 
in Ukraine to organise a referendum on becoming a constituent territory of the Russian federation or restoring Crimea’s 1992 constitution 
is compatible with constitutional principles” CDL-AD(2014)002. 
68 It is not clear that the electorate voted for independence, as the referendum question used a Russian word, samostoyatelnost, that could 
mean independence or greater autonomy: Shaun Walker, ‘East Ukraine goes to the polls for independence referendum’, The Observer 
(London) 11 May 2014.  
69 The position in Crimea is complicated by the question asked in the 16 March referendum, which provided voters with two choices: (1) 
reuniting Crimea with Russia as a subject of the Russian Federation; or (2) retaining the status of Crimea as part of Ukraine. The case of 
Crimea may then be an example of association rather than secession. In either case, the same principles would apply in relation to the 
requirement to deliberate on the future of the territory over a period of time. 
70 A UK parliamentary committee has accused Russia of using ‘ambiguous warfare’ tactics in Ukraine: Defence Committee, ‘Towards the 
Next Defence and Security Review: Part Two – NATO’, HC 358, 31 July 2014. 
71 Under the rules of general international law, a State is responsible for the actions of a non-State actor outside of its territory where the 
relationship is ‘one of [complete] dependence on the one side and control on the other’: Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007 43 at para 391. Such a 
finding will be exceptional.  
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example of choice-based or democratic secession, as the only force permitted in the context 
of the democratic right of secession is the force of the better argument – and that is certainly 
not the case here. 
 
